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Abstract
Empirical evidence indicates that lay-o costs consist of two elements, namely
ring costs and severance payments. This paper investigates business cycle and
steady state eects of ring costs and severance payments and discusses the dif-
ferences. We nd that severance payments imply a lower volatility of key labor
market variables compared with ring costs. Persistently increasing those costs,
reduces the welfare in the model economy, but increases employment. The reason
for the dierent performance is the impact on the wage and the additional stimulus
caused by severance payments. The social planner therefore faces a trade-o in the
design of employment protection. Furthermore, the appropriate design of lay-o
costs also has strong implications for the design of other elements of employment
protection.
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1 Motivation
Labor market rigidities are often blamed to be the driving force of more sclerotic labor
markets in Europe than in the United States, as for instance shown by Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). Most of the existing literature has focused on the implications of ring
costs, as e.g. Veracierto (2008) focuses on the business cycle implications, Messina and
Vallanti (2006) discuss the eects on job ows, while Ljungqvist (2001) provides a survey
of the eects of ring costs in dierent models.
However, Garibaldi and Violante (2005) show that one has to distinguish between two
immanent elements of lay-o costs, namely (i) transfers from rm to worker and (ii) a
tax that is paid outside the rm-worker pair. We will refer to the former as a severance
payment and to the latter as a ring cost. A ring cost is a wasteful tax, i.e. a real cost,
on separation which is non-Coasean. In contrast, severance payments are paid directly
to the worker, increasing consumption opportunities. More precisely, from the rm's
perspective there is no dierence between paying a wasteful ring tax or transferring
this money to the worker. However, from the worker's perspective, there is a major
dierence. In case of separation, the worker will receive an additional payment.
Furthermore, the authors show that within a search model with insider and outsider
workers, they obtain dierent results from imposing a ring tax or a severance payment.
Along this line, Cozzi et al. (2010) present evidence for the importance of severance
payment for a set of OECD countries. They show that severance payments for instance
in Italy equal 20 monthly wages, while they equal 1.2 monthly wages in the United
Kingdom.
Burda (1992) uses a static time search and matching model and nds that the excess
costs for rms beyond the payment received by the worker is a driving factor of the
eect of such institutions on equilibrium unemployment.
Fella (2009) discusses the optimal private provision of severance pay, as well as alloca-
tional and welfare consequences of government intervention in addition to the optimal
private arrangement. He nds that severance payments complement unemployment in-
surance and that costly separations demands positive severance pay.
However, this paper focuses on the business cycle implications of ring cost, severance
payments respectively. As business cycle stabilization is a key objective of governments
the appropriate design of employment protection can help in achieving this goal.
We use a Real Business Cycle (RBC, for short) search and matching model augmented
by ring costs, severance payments respectively. In order to introduce those costs prop-
erly, we model separations endogenously, creating an additional decision margin for the
rm.
Our analysis shows that under both specications, qualitative eects are nearly the
same. However, we nd that the model economy with ring costs is much more volatile
than the severance payment economy. Furthermore, the model with severance payments
replicates the second moments observed for the U.S. economy fairly well. The model is
able to generate a strong Beveridge curve and matches second moments reasonably well.
Furthermore, we investigate the steady state implications of changing the cost param-
eters. We nd that all reforms reduce the welfare in our model economy, but increase
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employment. The main mechanisms at work are the eect on wages and the additional
demand stimulus steaming from transfers to the worker.
We show that the government (or social planner) faces a trade-o in the design of employ-
ment protection. Increasing e.g. severance payments would reduce welfare but reduce
unemployment. Furthermore, the design of lay-o costs creates strong spill-over eects
for other elements of employment protection.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section develops the model and section 3
discusses our simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Derivation
We now present a RBC model with search anad matching frictions. Our economy con-
tains two agents. Households and rms. Households consume and provide labor inelas-
tically. Firms produce output using labor as the only input. While choosing the optimal
path of labor, rms face hiring and ring costs, severance payments respectively. Finally,
wages are set in individualistic Nash bargaining.
2.1 The Household's Problem
We assume a discrete-time economy with an innite living representative household who
seeks to maximize its utility given by
U = E0
1X
t=0
t

ﬀ
ﬀ   1
C
ﬀ 1
ﬀ
t

; (1)
where ﬀ gives the degree of risk aversion. The household inelastically supplies one unit
of labor, represented by the unit interval. Furthermore, household members pool there
income as in Merz (1995). The household maximizes consumption subject to the budget
constraint
Ct + Tt =Wt + but +t; (2)
where b are unemployment benets nanced by real lump sum taxes, Tt, from the gov-
ernment. Wt is labor income and t are aggregate prots. The demand function is given
by Cit =

Pit
Pt

 
Ct, where Pt =
R 1
0
h
P
 1

it di
i 
 1
is the price index.
The rst-order condition is given by
C
 
1
ﬀ
t = t; (3)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint.
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2.2 The Firm's Problem
We assume perfectly competitive rms that consist of a continuum of dierent jobs.
While aggregate productivity At is common to all rms, the specic productivity ait is
idiosyncratic and every period it is drawn in advance of the production process from a
time-invariant distribution with c.d.f. F (a). The rm specic production function is the
product of aggregate productivity, the number of jobs and the aggregate over individual
jobs and can be written as
yit = Atnit
Z
~ait
a
f(a)
1  F (~ait)
da  AtnitH(~ait): (4)
Where ~ait is an endogenously determined critical threshold. Then, the endogenous job
destruction rate is given by nit = F (~ait). Although their is no consensus in the literature
on the proper determination of the separation margin, following Fujita et al. (2007),
Fujita and Ramey (2007, 2008) and Ramey (2008) empirical evidence seems to favor
endogenous separations.
Since employment decisions are subject to matching frictions, we introduce a Cobb-
Douglas type matching function with constant returns to scale, i.e.
	(ut; vt) = mu

t v
1 
t ; (5)
ut is the number of unemployed worker, vt is the number of open vacancies, assumed to
lie on the unit interval and  2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of the matching function. The
match eciency is governed by m > 0. The underlying homogeneity assumption leads
to the probability of a vacancy being lled q(t) = m
 
t , where labor market tightness is
given by t = vt=ut. Connecting the results for job creation and job destruction enables
us to determine the evolution of employment at rm i as
nit+1 = (1  it+1)(nit + vitq(t)): (6)
As we will illustrate later on, the worker is paid according to his specic productivity
and we follow this approach by establishing the theorem that ring costs also depend
on the worker's specic productivity. Initially, we dene the ring costs function for a
specic worker as a linear real-valued function given by g(ait) = kait, such that total
ring costs evolve as follows
G(ait) = k
Z ~ait
0
a
f(a)
1  F (~ait)
da; (7)
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where k > 0 is the share of the productivity wasted as a tax.1 The rm maximizes the
present value of real prots given by
i0 = E0
1X
t=0
t
t
0
[AtnitH(~ait) Wit   cvit  G(ait)] : (8)
Where the rst term in parenthesis is revenue, the second term is the wage bill, which
is given by the aggregate of individual wages
Wit = nit
Z
~ait
wt(a)
f(a)
1  F (~ait)
da: (9)
This follows from the fact that the wage is not identical for all workers, instead it depends
on the idiosyncratic productivity. The third term reects the total costs of posting a
vacancy, with c > 0 giving real costs per vacancy. The last term gives the total ring
costs. The corresponding rst order conditions are given by
@nit : t =  
@Wt
@nt
+ AtH(~at) + Ett+1(1  t+1)t+1; (10)
@vit :
c
q(t)
= Ett+1(1  t+1)t+1; (11)
here t is the multiplier on the evolution of employment.
The job creation condition is a combination of these two equations and is given by
c
q(t)
= Ett+1(1  t+1)

At+1H(~at+1) 
@Wt+1
@nt+1
+
c
q(t+1)

: (12)
This condition reects the hiring decision as a trade-o between the costs of a vacancy
and the expected return. Where 1=q(t) is the duration of the relationship between rm
and worker. The lower the probability of lling a vacancy, the longer the duration of
existing contracts, because the rm is not able to replace the worker instantaneously.
Subsequently, we determine the wage and the threshold for the ring costs case and the
severance payment case.
2.3 The Bargaining Problem
2.3.1 Firing Costs
Due to search frictions in the labor market, the match shares and economic rent, which
is splitted in individual Nash bargaining. We maximize the Nash product
w = argmax
n
(Wt   Ut)
(Jt   Vt + kat)
1 
o
: (13)
1One should notice that we likewise could have introduced a ring cost function that features the indi-
vidual real wage as an argument. However, our approach is w.l.o.g. since the wage also depends on the
idiosyncratic productivity, i.e. this is only a scaling issue.
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0    1 is the relative bargaining power and due to a free entry condition the equilib-
rium value of Vt is zero. Consistently, the individual real wage satises the optimality
condition
Wt(at)  Ut =

1  
(Jt(at) + kat) : (14)
To obtain an explicit expression for the individual real wage we have to determine the
asset value functions and substitute them into the Nash bargaining solution (14).
For the rm the asset value of the job depends on the real revenue, the real wage and
if the job is not destroyed, the discounted future value. Otherwise the job is destroyed
and hence the rm has to pay ring costs. In terms of a Bellman equation the asset
value is given by
Jt(at) = Atat   wt(at) (15)
+ Ett+1

(1  t+1)
Z
~at+1
Jt+1(a)
f(a)
1  F (~at+1)
da  t+1kat

:
The asset value of being employed for the worker consists of the real wage, the discounted
continuation value and in case of separation the value of being unemployed
Wt(at) = wt(at) + Ett+1(1  t+1)
Z
~at+1
Wt+1(a)
f(a)
1  F (~at+1)
da (16)
+ Ett+1t+1Ut+1:
Analogously, the asset value of a job seeker is given by
Ut = b+ Ett+1tq(t)(1  t+1)
Z
~at+1
Wt+1
f(a)
1  F (~at+1)
da (17)
+ Ett+1(1  tq(t)(1  t+1))Ut+1:
Unemployed worker receive the value of home production b, the discounted continua-
tion value of being unemployed and if she is matched she receives the value of future
employment. Some algebra then gives the expression for the individual real wage
wt(at) = 
 
Atat + ct + (1  t+1t+1)kat

+ (1  )b: (18)
The introduction of ring costs increases the individual real wage due to the change
in the fall back position of the rm. Having discussed the wage setting process we
sequentially want to focus on the ring decision and the corresponding threshold.
The rm will endogenously separate from a worker if and only if
Jt(at) <  kat; (19)
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such that the threshold can be written as
~at =
(1  )b+ ct  
c
q(t)
(1  )At + (1   + (   1)t+1t+1)k
; (20)
where (1    + (   1)t+1t+1)k > 0 such that ring cost decrease the threshold, i.e.
protect less productive worker.
2.3.2 Severance Payments
Severance payments are close to the last subsection, in which we introduced the ring
costs into the bargaining problem and the asset value functions. However, now the
worker's asset value function of being employed is inuenced. The reason is straightfor-
ward: a severance payment is directly transferred to the worker and hence she considers
this expected income in case of separation in the bargaining process. Here, we would
like to emphasize that we respect the nding of Garibaldi and Violante (2005), showing
that lay-o costs have two components and that - for Italy - severance payments amount
to 2/3 of total lay-o costs. Therefore, we choose a more general approach to model
severance payments allowing for the case that the amount of ring costs for the rm is
not equal to the payment received by the worker.
Consistently, the asset value function in case of being employed now looks as follows
Wt(at) = wt(at) + Ett+1(1  t+1)
Z
~at+1
Wt+1(a)
f(a)
1  F (~at+1)
da (21)
+ Ett+1t+1

Ut+1 + ~kat

;
such that in case of separation, the worker receives a payment of ~kat, where ~k > 0 is the
severance payment parameter.
The other two missing asset value functions remain unchanged and therefore read as
Jt(at) = Atat   wt(at) (22)
+ Ett+1

(1  t+1)
Z
~at+1
Jt+1(a)
f(a)
1  F (~at+1)
da  t+1(~k + k)at

;
Ut = b+ Ett+1tq(t)(1  t+1)
Z
~at+1
Wt+1
f(a)
1  F (~at+1)
da (23)
+ Ett+1(1  tq(t)(1  t+1))Ut+1:
Then, rm and worker solve the Nash problem
w = argmax
n
(Wt   Ut + ~kat)
(Jt   Vt + (~k + k)at)
1 
o
; (24)
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such that the individual real wage is given by
wt(at) =  [Atat + ct] + (1  )b+
h
(   t+1t+1) k + (2   1  t+1t+1) ~k
i
at: (25)
In the precedent section we concluded that ring costs increase the real wage, as work-
ers exploit the change of the rm's fall back position. However, including severance
payments tends to decrease the wage. To be precise, assume the reasonable case of
symmetric bargaining, viz.  = 0:5, and abstract from ring costs (k = 0). Then, the
wage reads as
wt(at) =  [Atat + ct] + (1  )b  t+1t+1~kat: (26)
The introduction of severance payments decreases the individual real wage due to the
change in the fall back position of the worker. Having discussed the wage setting process
we sequentially want to focus on the ring decision and the corresponding threshold.
The threshold for the severance payments case can then be found by solving Jt(at) <
 (~k + k)at,
~at =
(1  )b+ ct  
c
q(t)
(1  )At + (1 +    t+1t+1) k + (2   t+1t+1) ~k
; (27)
where (1 +    t+1t+1) k + (2   t+1t+1) ~k > 0 such that severance payments also
decrease the threshold. For k = 0, we obtain a model in which the entire amount of
lay-o costs is distributed to the worker.
Severance payments have a larger eect on the threshold, as c.p. and if k = 0 in the
severance payments case for ~k = k,
(2   t+1t+1) > (1   + (   1)t+1t+1); (28)
as severance payments have a large eect on the worker's fall back position.
2.4 Model solution
Finally, we need to dene the market clearing condition
Yt = Ct + cvt: (29)
We assume an aggregate productivity shock that is AR(1), i.e.
At = A
A
t 1e
A;t ; (30)
where 0 < A < 1 is the autocorrelation of the shock and A;t  N(0; ﬀA) is an i.i.d.
error term following an univariate normal density distribution with standard deviation
ﬀA and cov(At 1; A;t) = 0 8 t.
We calibrate the model on a quarterly basis for the United States and set parameter
9
values according to some stylized facts and the recent literature. Risk aversion, ﬀ, is set
to the value 2 and the discount factor, , is 0.99. The steady state separation rate, , is
0.12 according to den Haan et al. (2000). The exogenous separation rate is calibrated to
be 0.068 as in den Haan et al. (2000), such that the endogenous separation rate can be
computed to be n =  
x
1 x
. Then, the critical threshold can be computed by using the
inverse function, i.e. ~a = F 1(n). Parameters characterizing the c.d.f F (a) are taken
from Krause and Lubik (2007) and are set to LN = 0, and ﬀLN = 0:12. Furthermore, the
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment, , is set to 0.7, while
the steady state rm matching rate is q = 0:9. Then, matches in steady state are given
by 	 = 
1 
n, where steady state employment is set to 0.9. The steady state vacancy
rate can then be found and equals v = 	
q
, which gives the steady state labor market
tightness  = v
1 n
. In addition, the match eciency is given by m = q. Vacancy
posting costs are 0.05 and the unemployment benets are 0.5. Following the discussion
in Brown et al. (2009), we set k = ~k = 0:1, i.e. 10 % of the worker's productivity is paid
as a ring tax, severance payment respectively. We assume symmetric bargaining and
set  = 0:5. Finally, the shock is autocorrelated with A = 0:9 as usual in the literature.
3 Discussion
We will start our analysis of dierent lay-o costs by a discussion of the implications for
business cycle uctuations, viz. for the volatility of key variables. Then, we will proceed
to analyze the eects on welfare.
3.1 Business Cycle Fluctuations
Figure 1 presents the response of our model economy to a favorable one percent pro-
ductivity shock. We distinguish between three cases. First, and plotted in black, we
consider the model with ring costs. Then, plotted in red, we repeat the excercise for
the severance payment case, without ring costs. Finally, plotted in blue, we assume
that besides severance payments, the rm has to pay a wasteful ring tax.2
A rst graphical inspectation of the impulse response functions yields the insight that
there is almost no dierence between the severance payment case and the split case, i.e.
the case where the rm has to pay ring costs and severance payments. Therefore, we
will not further describe the split case and focus instead on the dierence between ring
cost and severance payment. We nd that qualitatively the eects are very similar. A
positive productivity shock increases the incentives for rms to post vacancies, in order
to extract surpluses. Therefore, vacancies increase and job creation raises on impact.
As output increases, unemployment falls, increasing labor market tightness. In order to
keep more workers, rms decrease the cut-o point, which reduces the separation rate.
Real wags increase as workers demand a part of the larger surplus created by the shock.
2To be precise, ring: k = 0:1, severance: ~k = 0:1; k = 0, split: ~k = 0:07; k = 0:03 as in Garibaldi and
Violante (2005).
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However, as we have discussed in the bargaining section before, the severance payment
case implies a larger reaction of wages, as the change in the fall back positions caries over
to the extraction of surpluses over the cycle. This channel causes the visible dierences
in the convergence process. The severance payment economy is less persistent, as the
higher wage decreases incentives for rms to create new jobs. Consistently, we observe
a smaller impact on job ows.
Let us consider the second moments of our simulations shown in Table 1. Data values
for the United States are taken from Shimer (2005). The volatilities for key variables
are presented for the three cases considered above. We nd that the ring cost model
is much more volatile than the severance payment model. Unemployment is almost ve
times as volatile in the ring cost case, which has of course strong implications for the
design of unemployment benets, i.e. automatic stabilizers in general. The response of
vacancies is almost twice as large, implying that together labor market tightness is quite
volatile. As discussed, the ring model implies larger adjustment, i.e. job ows, and
hence a stronger adjustment and hence larger volatility of the separation rate.
Furthermore, all specications create a strong Beveridge curve, but fail to create the
negative correlation between job creation and destruction.
3.2 Welfare Implications
3.2.1 Measuring Welfare Gains
Here, I adopt the strategy used in Poilly and Sahuc (2008) and Poilly and Wesselbaum
(2010). We denote the welfare in the initial steady state by
W init0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

ﬀ
ﬀ   1
(Cinitt )
ﬀ 1
ﬀ

; (31)
where Cinitt is the path of consumption choosed in the initial steady state. Then, welfare
in the new steady state is given by
W
final
0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

ﬀ
ﬀ   1
(Cfinalt )
ﬀ 1
ﬀ

: (32)
Following Lucas (1987), we interpret the welfare gains as follows: The gain is given by
the fraction of the consumption stream an individual should give in order to compensate
for the fact that he or she has to switch from a initial steady-state to a new one.
Then, , the welfare gain in percentage points, can be found by solving
W
final
0 = E0
1X
t=0
t

ﬀ
ﬀ   1
(Cinitt )
ﬀ 1
ﬀ (1 + )
ﬀ 1
ﬀ

; (33)
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which is
 =
"
W
final
0
W init0
# ﬀ
ﬀ 1
  1: (34)
3.2.2 The Eects of Using Lay-o Costs
In order to understand the welfare impications of using the two dierent lay-o costs,
we use a simple mind experiment. Assume that our economy in the severance payment
specication (section 2.3.2) is in a steady state, where both lay-o costs are 0. Then,
we distinguish three dierent cases. First, we increase the ring cost parameter (to a
value of 0.1). Second, the severance payment parameter is set to 0.1, leaving the ring
cost parameter unchanged. Finally, we increase both parameters simultaneously, viz. by
setting both parameters to 0.05.3
The results for these three reforms are described in Table 2. The transmission processes
are shown in Figures 2 to 4. We nd that in any case, welfare is decreased.4
An increase in lay-o costs leads the rm to be more reluctant in ring workers. The
rm therefore, reduces the cut-o point and keeps even less productive workers. This
implies a drop in the separation rate and the job destruction rate. Simultaneously, the
rm has less incentives to create new jobs and reduces vacancy posting. However, as
visible from the transmission process, the eect working along the destruction margin
dominates and hence, employment increases.
As we have discussed in the wage setting section, higher ring costs increase real wages
and higher severance payments decrease real wages. Finally, output and consumption
decrease, which is driven by a higher wage bill and imposed lay-o costs.
If we take a closer look on the quantitative eects from our experiment, we nd that
a combination of severance payment and ring cost decreases welfare by the smallest
amount. However, this result is driven by lower consumption. We nd that these three
reforms increase employment, as they reduce the destruction ow by a larger amount
than they reduce job creation. Along this line, we nd that higher employment protection
via increased severance payments comes with lower labor market ows and lower wages.
In contrast, higher ring costs increase wages. Severance payments have an additional
stabilizing eect on output (compare the drop in the ring cost case vs. the drop in
the severance payment case), as the payment to the worker yields an intrinsic demand
stimulus.
We can draw the following conclusion, higher lay-o costs reduce the welfare in the model
economy, as higher turnover costs and a increased wage bill reduce output. In contrast,
increased employment protection increases employment and reduce labor market ows.
3Jointly, they equal 0.1 and hence we can compare this reform with the rst two cases.
4In our model, welfare is entirely driven by consumption. However, including the disutility of work is
likely to leave our qualitative results unaected, as employment increases.
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4 Final Remarks
This paper compares two elements of lay-o costs, namely ring costs and severance
payments. Firing costs are a wasteful tax paid by the rm, while severance payments
are a transfer from the rm to the worker in case of separation. The paper by Garibaldi
and Violante (2005) points to the importance of severance payments and shows that
they are more appropriate to model lay-o costs.
We develop a general equilibrium RBC model that allows to explicitly distinguish be-
tween severance payments and ring costs. We nd that ring costs increase wages,
while severance payments (at least for reasonable values of the bargaining power) de-
crease the wage. Besides this nding, we show that the model with ring costs shows a
much higher volatility of key labor market variables as the model with severance pay-
ments, as it generates much more incentives to adjust. A combination of ring costs and
severance payments is able to create te empirically observed second moments reasonably
well. In addition, the model is able to generate the Beveridge curve, i.e. the negative
correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
A second dimension of those two lay-o costs are the dierent eects steaming from
using them as instruments for labor market reforms. We nd that welfare is reduced in
any considered case, as higher turnover costs and a increased wage bill reduce output. In
addition, we nd that higher employment protection increases employment and reduces
labor market ows.
These insights yield a signicant trade-o in the design of employment protection. In-
creasing e.g. severance payments would reduce welfare but reduce unemployment by
almost 40 %. Furthermore, the design of lay-o costs in the system of employment pro-
tection creates strong spill-over eects for other ingredients of employment protection,
e.g unemployment benets, or other automatic stabilizers. For instance, let the govern-
ment have a business cycle stabilization goal, then the severance payment is preferable
in terms of generating less uctuations in response to an exogenous shock. In addition,
as unemployment uctuates less, this implies that less workers have to use e.g. unem-
ployment benets, which is benecial, as workers stay employed, rms do not have to
pay adjustment costs and the government does not have to pay unemployment benets.
Based upon our ndings, if the government chooses a mix of ring costs and severance
payments, it should ensure that severance payments are dominant.
In summary, severance payments generate less uctuations, reduce welfare by the small-
est amount, and reduce unemployment by the largest amount. In contrast, ring cost
generate more uctuations, have stronger negative eects on welfare, and are less suc-
cessfull in reducing unemployment. The main mechanisms at work are the eect on
wages and the additional demand stimulus steaming from transfers to the worker.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Business Cycle Fluctuations.
Data Severance Firing Split
Standard Deviations
u 0.19 0.07 0.37 0.07
v 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.13
 0.38 0.20 0.58 0.20
 0.08 0.02 0.21 0.02
jcr - 0.06 0.49 0.06
jdr - 0.04 0.49 0.04
Correlations
u; v -0.89 -0.91 -0.96 -0.90
jcr; jdr -0.36 0.40 0.85 0.37
Notes: Theoretical moments. Data responds to U.S. values taken from Shimer (2005). Details on
the calibration can be found in the text.
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Table 2: Welfare Implications.
Firing Severance Severance & Firing
Welfare
100   -8.36 -5.43 -6.19
Steady State
u -0.02 -0.38 -0.27
v -0.72 -0.07 -0.43
	 -0.33 -0.30 -0.32
jcr -0.31 -0.31 -0.32
jdr -0.96 -0.97 -0.99
w 0.002 -0.01 -0.002
Notes: All values are in percentage terms. Steady state changes are in percent of the initial steady
state (where k = ~k = 0). The parameter governing the share of ring costs, severance payments
resp. is increased from 0 to 0:1. For the latter case, where we increase k and ~k simultaneously, we
set both parameters to 0:05, such that they jointly equal 0:1.
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Figure 1: Firing Tax vs. Severance Payment. Horizontal axes measure quarters, vertical axes
deviations from steady state.
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Figure 2: Increase of ring cost parameter k = 0 ! 0:1. Horizontal axes measure quarters,
vertical axes levels.
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Figure 3: Increase of severance payment parameter ~k = 0 ! 0:1. Horizontal axes measure
quarters, vertical axes levels.
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Figure 4: Increase of severance payment, ~k = 0 ! 0:05, and ring cost, k = 0 ! 0:05,
parameter. Horizontal axes measure quarters, vertical axes levels.
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